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Abstract 
The great inequality in the distribution of world resources is well represented by the co-
existence of two opposite phenomena: the scarcity of resources that relegates billions of 
individuals in extreme poverty conditions, and the over-consumption of resources by a 
minority of inhabitants who waste and pollute the planet earth. 
In addition to the serious ethical paradox produced by the combination of these negative 
forces, every year poverty and pollution cause severe economic losses, both directly and for 
negative externalities. Is it possible to reverse this ethical and economic paradox and find a 
joint solution to these two forms of world pollution? 
This paper illustrates a simple model of earth basic income, which could serve as an easy 
solution to both problems: a taxation mechanism on waste production as a means to finance 
basic income. 
 
Introduction 
Poverty and earth pollution are two main problems that the world still faces in the 21
st
 cen-
tury. The advancement of civilization, economic growth, social and cultural progress, together 
with the diffusion of civil and political rights have not been sufficient to resolve these issues 
over the years. 
Paradoxically, the attainment of ever greater wealth over time on a global scale and the 
increasing inequality of capital distribution highlight the persistence of over-consumption of 
resources by a minority of inhabitants of the planet – consequently producing great quantities 
of waste and acuting the lack of those resources for the majority of the world population. 
Besides the serious ethical paradox caused by the simultaneous existence of these opposing 
phenomena, every year the negative externalities of poverty and pollution cause severe 
economic damage, both directly and indirectly. 
According to the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), gas emissions from 
greenhouses, which are one factor of the planet’s overheating, produce economic damage 
2 
that can be estimated at around 150 billion dollars every year. Intangible damage of an ethical, 
environmental and natural kind should be obviously added to this figure. 
Apart from being one of the ‘evils’ of our time, to use Beveridge’s term, poverty causes serious 
ethical, social and economical damage: people die of hunger, children grow up in poverty with 
few opportunities for a better life, whole populations suffer dire hygienic and dietary 
conditions. The socio-economic circumstances in which poverty develops also give rise to 
other social ‘evils’: disease, illiteracy and crime. 
In Western countries poverty develops in rich societies, thus causing further social and ethical 
problems such as wide social inequalities, social exclusion and marginalization, relational and 
familial fragility, and depression. In short, poverty causes direct damage to economic systems 
– as well as indirectly, this being though less visible but yet quantifiable. 
If we add the damage caused by environmental pollution to that caused by poverty, which can 
be defined as a special form of ‘social pollution’, we find out that the world economic system 
yearly suffers considerable losses. 
The paradoxical question addressed by this brief article is a very simple one: can these two 
‘types of damage’ be converted into something positive? 
The operation appears to be a rather complex one: the product of two elements with negative 
value is positive for mathematicians – this is, however, not the case for social scientists. But it 
is possible to propose a model of global basic income financed from environmental damage 
and, consequently, to derive solutions from ‘the waste’. 
The taxation of pollution in order to finance a basic income capable of defeating poverty may 
be the simple solution to this dual issue. 
 
A simple simulation model 
Approximately ten years ago, Michel Genet and Philippe Van Parijs suggested a model of basic 
income for all European citizens, the Eurogrant, which based on a direct financing from energy 
taxes (1). The authors ended their paper with several questions, one of which advocated the 
implementation of this instrument outside Europe. 
The idea proposed in this paper reprises the central principle of Genet and Van Parijs’s model – 
to finance basic income by means of an ecological tax –, but it gives the model global 
dimensions and uses a slightly different taxation system. Instead of an energy tax, the world 
basic income, termed ‘Earth Basic Income’ (EBI), could be financed by means of a tax on 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
The main difference, however, is that in this case ecological taxation itself would be the goal of 
the model and not a mere financial instrument for basic income. In that way, a double result 
would be pursued: on the one hand, to finance EBI in order to fight poverty on the entire 
planet and, on the other, to encourage the achievement of a minimum level of greenhouse gas 
emissions so that earth pollution can be reduced. 
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Since both problems may possibly be solved by a taxation system that operates, in the former 
case, as a financing instrument and as a ‘negative’ incentivization policy in the latter, the issue 
must be considered a problem of optimal taxation with two constraints. 
The first constraint concerns the level of pollution that can be ‘tolerated’ by the planet.  
For convenience, pollution intensity is a value that can be based on the threshold magnitudes 
of greenhouse gas emissions established at the Kyoto Conference on Bio-Climatic Change in 
1997. According to the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries and countries with transitional 
economies, such as the Eastern European countries, must effect a 5% reduction of their 
greenhouse gas emissions, with respect to values of 1990, from 2008 to 2012 (2). 
This average percentage value is obtained, when considering the reductions of 8% in emissions 
by the European Union, 7% by the USA, and 6% by Japan. Other countries must only attempt 
to stabilize their emissions, and in the case of outstanding countries, such as Iceland, they may 
even slightly increase them. Developing countries are exempted from this commitment so that 
limits are not imposed on their socio-economic development. 
These reductions are in fact considerable – especially for the most industrialized countries 
such as the USA – because in the same period of time the production rate of these gases is 
expected to increase by about 20%: the net result would be therefore a potential 25% 
reduction of emissions. Not surprisingly, countries such as the USA and Australia have decided 
not to ratify the Treaty. However, concerns about the Treaty not entering into force dissolved 
this year as Russia announced its ratification. The requirements set out in section 25 (3) of the 
Treaty were consequently fulfilled; and the Kyoto Protocol legally came into force on 16
th
 
February 2005. 
A commitment of this kind entails very high costs for the economic systems of some of the 
countries involved in the Kyoto negotiations, in particular for nations like the USA, Canada, 
Japan and New Zealand, whose production systems use very large amounts of energy; for 
them the costs of signing the Treaty would be relatively higher than, for example, for Europe 
(see table 1). 
 
Table 1.  CO2 emissions and costs of  Kyoto Treaty 
Country  CO2 emissions 
 (millions of 
tons) 
Emission reduction 
(Kyoto constraint) 
GDP variation in 
2010 (%) 
USA 5410 7% - 0.27 
EU 3171 8% - 0.17 
Japan 1128 6% - 0.03 
Source: OCSE, 1999 
 
It is at this point that the mechanism described in this paper could be implemented. Its central 
aim may be enlightened by the following questions: In the absence of a binding legislation, 
how can these costs be off-set for the industrialized countries? And, how can a virtuous 
behavior, which leads to better climatic conditions and economic advantages, be stimulated? 
One way could be to tax a country that doesn’t adopt a virtuous behavior proportionally to its 
deviation. This would motivate a government to set a limit on its emissions, in order to 
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become exempt from the tax. Countries that do not comply with this restriction would be 
taxed on the value of gas emissions that exceed the established threshold: 
 
1.) Ti= (XPi - XSi) t 
 
The amount of ecological taxes (Ti ) collected in country ‘i’ would therefore be proportional to 
the difference between the gas emissions established in Kyoto for this country (XSi) and the gas 
emissions produced by it (XPi), multiplied by the ecological tax (t). 
One possible hypothesis adjustable to the model presupposes each country to provide itself 
with monitoring systems able to distribute the taxation amount (Ti) among polluting 
enterprises according to the emissions they produce. 
Under a second hypothesis, the tax does not determine secondary effects that may retroact on 
the model, for instance by decreasing wages or increasing commodity prices, and may partially 
bypass the effects of introducing a basic income. This could be controlled by means of a 
compensatory mechanism, for example, by eliminating other ecological taxes on enterprises in 
order to maintain prices and wages stable. The reduction of public revenue due to a lower 
ecological taxation could be off-set by the decrease of social expenditure on social assistance 
measures that would partially lose their purpose with the implementation of the EBI. 
Having identified our first goal, i.e. the fulfillment of the Kyoto parameters for greenhouse gas 
emissions, let us now see how this could be related to financing a basic income.  
The second constraint lays on the exogenously fixed amount of EBI. 
The tax amount Ti in all the ‘k’ taxed countries can be used to finance the EBI for the entire 
world population, or at least part of it. Let us take as an example the population of age (pop): 
 
                                         k 
2.) EBI * pop = ∑   Ti 
                                         i=1 
Nonetheless, two problems arise from this simple equation. The first involves an ethical issue. 
Indeed, it could be argued that in such a way the EBI would be financed, at the end, with 
money deriving indirectly from pollution. An instrument used to fight poverty would end up 
depending on the existence of greenhouse gas emissions that surpass the levels permitted. 
Yet, there is a straightforward answer for this objection: firstly, the money would derive from 
the fight against pollution, not from pollution itself; secondly, the fact that the model uses a 
constant exogenous value of EBI does not determine a variation in the sum of basic income 
account due to greenhouse gas emissions. 
This gives rise to the second problem. The fact that the EBI is independent of the value of 
produced gases and that it is actually fixed exogenously, proposes a difficulty when calculating 
the taxation level. Or, in other words: how can ‘t’ be determined, being it a value dependant 
from a variable such as (XPi), which might, or better should, change over time? 
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The same issue also arises from a mathematical perspective if equation 2 is substituted by 
equation 1: 
 
3.) ∑ t = ∑   Ti / ∑ (XPi - XSi) = EBI * pop / ∑ (XPi - XSi) 
    
There seem to be three different solutions to the problem of a temporally changing variable: 
to propose a different taxation system for each country; to choose a tax that varies over time; 
or to allow the total amount of taxes collected to finance the EBI, that is to say, letting ‘∑ Ti’ 
vary. 
In the first case, (t) would depend on the decisions taken by individual countries (ti). At this 
point the summatory of (t) values would not be equal to the product of (t), multiplied by the 
number (k) of taxed countries: 
 
4.) ∑ t = k * t ≠ ∑   ti 
 
Each country would determine its own tax amount and taxation system (by adopting, for 
instance, a proportional system, or a progressive one, or by implementing other parameters), 
as long as the required amount (Ti) is achieved. A drawback may possibly be different taxation 
systems having evident and dangerous consequences on market mechanisms. 
A second solution consists on choosing a tax (t) that is the same for all countries but varies 
over time. This could certainly ensure a constant flow of ‘∑ Ti’ resources to the EBI for each 
time period taken up into consideration (tt=0,1,2...n), independently of the values of greenhouse 
gases emitted above tolerable levels. At this point equation 3 should be modified as following: 
 
5.) tt=0,1,2...n = ∑ Ti / k * ∑ (XPi t=0,1,2...n - XSi) 
 
In such a case the variability of (t) is strictly temporal: it depends on the emissions produced 
over the number of years (n) by the various countries (XPi t=0,1,2...n). The product of these two 
variabilities would ensure, besides, a constant flow of resources. 
Still, the variability of (t) over time may be followed by two further problems. The first one 
regards the emergence of numerous opportunities for free riding. If the total amount of 
emissions (the denominator in equation 5) changes due to the virtuous (or vicious) behavior of 
a number of countries, the effects of (t) variations will affect too those countries that have 
kept out of action (4). The second problem suggests that the impossibility of knowing future (t) 
values could bring difficulties to economic systems, in which taxed enterprises operate. 
It seems therefore that the only feasible option for solving the problem of variability is to 
determine a ‘∑ Ti’ amount that varies over time. Evidently, this third solution may, however, 
cause distress as EBI financing may be in danger, should ecological taxes decrease. 
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This paradoxical scenario is dangerous both in ethical terms and in terms of the measure’s 
financial efficacy. If the taxation and/or incentivization mechanism achieves the results 
expected, pollution levels could decrease; but in such case, the same would happen to the 
resources available for EBI financing. This seems at first sight to be a trade-off between the 
fight against poverty and the fight against pollution. Yet, in reality, this ethical dilemma can be 
easily avoided: as mentioned above, pollution and poverty produce economic as well as social 
damage. A reduction in the economic costs of these phenomena could therefore be used as 
added value for the operation, from which additional financial sources could be derived. 
A Guarantee Fund (GF) could be activated for security reasons when introducing the EBI. In this 
way, should emission levels decrease significantly, the maintenance of the measure over time 
would remain ensured. Equation 2 would therefore change into: 
 
                                                       k 
6.) EBI * pop + GF = ∑   Ti 
                                                       i=1 
 
The organization responsible for managing the EBI within, say, the United Nations could use 
the GF to assure activities related to the implementation and monitoring of EBI. These 
activities would include an analysis of the profits produced by the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. This added value would be analogously produced by the mechanism introduced 
together with the EBI. The resources generated through this operation could be transferred to 
the GF in order to sustain it (5). 
 
Conclusions 
This short paper has not sought to describe a complete financing model of basic income. Its 
aim has been rather to raise some points for consideration. My intention, further on, is to ‘fill’ 
this simple theoretical model with data on the worldwide production of greenhouse gases; so 
that, as a result, the model’s ability to implement basic income on a global scale becomes 
quantifiable. 
I have raised at least two considerations that go beyond commonplaces on the possibility of 
financing basic income and on the strength of its ethical justifications: 
- We can image a mechanism able to adjust a system of incentives and constraints and 
with which to attempt to solve two of the major issues of this century: poverty and 
earth pollution. The solution to both problems may be a mix of taxation on 
greenhouse gas emissions and a basic income for the entire world population finan-
ced with this tax. This highlights a basic principle of the EBI functioning mechanism: a 
minimum global re-distribution of the resources of the richest countries to the 
poorest ones – from those which most exploit the planet’s resources (partially 
destroying the planet) to those which make less use of the same resources – seems 
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ethically fair. Since the planet belongs to everybody, a minimum part of its resources 
should be destined to the worst-off. 
- Finding a system to finance basic income on a world scale is certainly a difficult 
operation, yet it is not utopian. Likewise, the possible perverse effects exerted on the 
economic system by this financing system and by the introduction of this measure 
may be controlled and restrained with a series of compensatory mechanisms. I have 
sought in this paper to prove the existence of different taxation solutions for basic 
income. I have described a taxation system based on greenhouse gas emissions (and 
expressed my preference for a fixed-tax system). I believe that the real problem with 
implementing a basic income on a global scale (and also with reducing greenhouse 
gases) is not the devising of theoretical models that can be applied and sustained 
over time. The real problem is governance: Now, who might actually manage both, a 
revolutionary policy like the above exposed and the needed natural capacity and 
authority (political, juridical and legislative) still remains the main question. 
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Notes 
1 Genet M./Van Parijs P.: “Eurogrant”, in: Basic Income Research Group (BIRG), Bulletin no.15, July, 1992. 
2 These gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrogen dioxide (N20), hydrofluoric carbon (HFC), 
perfluorated carbon (PFC) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). Reference year is 1990 for the first three gases and 
1995 for the remaining three.  
3 Section 25 states that the Treaty will be effective only when it has been ratified by at least 55 industrialized 
countries, representing not less than 55% of CO2 emissions (according to 1990 data). 
4 Not only might the incentive produced by the taxation system disappear due to this mechanism, but it could 
also have the opposite effect. In order to maintain total resources constant, the more virtuous the average 
behavior (reduction of emissions), the higher the ecological tax (t) will be. 
5 With the passing of time, the resources of the GF could be invested in economic activities to sustain specific 
programs for pollution reduction, especially in the poorest countries. The reduction of pollution may also 
reduce poverty by creating virtuous circles (on hygiene conditions, territorial development, etc.). 
